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Abstract 
Effort estimation is extremely challenging for developing secure software systems. Two major challenges are: (1) lack of validated 
methods or models, (2) large variation in existing security standards that limits applicability of existing methods. This paper reports 
an exploratory study in establishing effort estimation model for secure operating system software development in China. More 
specifically, we investigate the existing cost estimation relationships in the domain of secure software systems, then conduct a 
comparative analysis of existing Chinese IT security standards and the corresponding international standards, and build a 
customized estimation model to leverage cost estimation relationships with the most similar security requirements, with appropriate 
adjustment to reflect the differences in standards. The resultant model is evaluated through an example project and results show 
encouraging improvement in estimation accuracy.    
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1. Background and Motivations 
Effort estimation methods and models have been enthusiastically discussed in research community over the past 
several decades. However, the enthusiasm surprisingly cools down when the methods are put in practice in industry 
community [1, 2], especially for secure software system. Two major challenges are:  
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1) There is a lack of research in estimation methods and models for developing secure software systems, and 
among these, very few of reported studies offer validated methods or models to address this problem;  
2) Existing security standards have been evolving rapidly over the past two decades. Despite the complexity 
of IT security itself, such standards from different application domains or countries often demonstrates 
large variations in both contents and structures. The complexity of variations in IT standards place great 
limitations on the applicability of existing estimation methods.  
There are a number of existing cost estimation models and methods that address security-related issues, including 
COSECMO [5], COCOTS Security Extension [14], SECOMO [16], Function-Point Extension Analysis [15], 
SQUARE-Based Analysis [17], SAEM [18], and Lawrence Gordon’s model [19]. All of existing methods are largely 
based on international standards such as Common Criteria (CC) [4], and very few of them have been validated. Among 
those, COSECMO is reported to have only one calibration data point.  
The security standard used in developing secure operating system (OS) software products in China is a national 
standard, GB20272-2006. While it resembles with widely adopted international standards such as CC and Trusted 
Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC, also known as Orange Book) [8], there are some differences as well. 
The Chinese standards are presented from the perspective of building a Security Subsystem of an Information System 
which is the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of an information system, while the CC are viewed as the rule set for 
product evaluation [27]. Information security certification in China is based on the Chinese national standards. There 
have been 132 valid certificates issued from 2011 to 2014 [28].  
Although most local companies have adopted and tailored formal estimation models such as COCOMO or FPA to 
their own environments, those models are generally inapplicable in estimating the development effort for secure 
software systems. When estimators face difficulties in finding a suitable method, they will not be convinced by the 
estimates produced by the method. Consequently the method cannot be validated or improved due to lack of use and 
historical data. The vicious spiral goes on and on. Eventually these methods are abandoned and estimators are driven 
to guess work or thumb-up decisions. The industry is in desperate need of better approaches and guidance in providing 
more confidence in their estimates. 
2. Research Questions 
Three questions were formulated to direct the search and review of existing in estimation method for secure 
software system development: 
(1) How does the national standard GB20272 relate to existing international standards? 
(2) What estimation methods or models can be leveraged in our modeling? 
(3) What are the existing cost estimating relationships between security level and associated development effort? 
The first question intends to capture the similarities and differences between the national standard GB20272 and 
international ones on information security. Based on the relationship, we can map GB20272 to some widely-used 
standards, which will provide a feasible way to incorporate the national standard as the benchmark to evaluate the 
security level referred in the effort estimation method. 
According to [4, 5], it is believed that the software system with different security levels will have different costing 
patterns. The second question is to review on the existing quantitative relationship between security level and 
associated effort, which will provide a basis for building effort estimation method. 
The third question aims at identifying relevant estimation methods or models with security considerations and/or 
extension. Based on the industry setting, some estimation methods or models may be more suitable to act as the 
customization basis for our secure software effort estimation. 
The rest of the paper describes the research effort in deriving answers to the above questions and developing 
predictive models to address the sizing and costing issues of security-sensitive software systems. 
3. Understanding the Differences in Standards 
GB20272-2006 is the basis for the development as well as evaluation of secure operating systems (OS) software. 
We reviewed some related, widely adopted international security criteria or standards for software development, 
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including Common Criteria [4], Orange Book [8], ISO27000 Series [9], ISO21827 (SSE- CMM) [10], and some 
related Chinese national standards such as GB17859-1999 [11], GB20271-2006 [12].  
 
The relationships between GB20272 and other standards are illustrated in Figure 1. 
GB 17859 classifies the security protection capability of Computer Information Systems into five levels including 
discretionary protection, system audit protection, security flag protection, structure protection, and access verification 
protection. GB/T 20271 details the security functional requirements for each of the five security protection levels 
defined in GB 17859, for example, it elaborates on security audit and system recovery portion of GB 17859-1999 in 
more details. GB20272 is the enhancement and refinement of GB17859 and GB20271, with an emphasis on the 
operating system security requirement during the whole lifecycle. It remains the same five rating scales from level 1 
to level 5 in GB 17859, but with much detailed security technical requirements.  
The Common Criteria is a security requirement based evaluation criteria. The software product is evaluated to 
EAL1 to EAL7 for their security attribute. GB/T 20271 shares a high degree of similarities with CC v2.3 in terms of 
definitions for security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and technical requirements for 
security level classification.  
The Orange Book was published by Department of Defense in 1985. The security of software system is evaluated 
from level D to level A based on the security mechanism implemented in the system. It focuses on operating systems, 
and does not separate security functionalities with security assurance. Now in many countries it is replaced by CC.  
ISO27000 series standards mainly focus on the development process for secure IT system. The standard acts more 
as the guideline than an evaluation standard. SSE-CMM is also a process-oriented standard. The process for secure 
software development can be evaluated from CL1 to CL5 based on SSE-CMM.  
 
Figure 1.  Corresponding Relation among the Standards 
We compare the reviewed standards with GB 20272 and score them in a qualitative manner according to their 
evaluation basis, evaluation target, year and overall feasibility, as summarized in Table 1.  Each column of the first 
three aspects is scored from one to five ‘*’ according to the similarities with GB20272, or potential applicability in 
the case study setting. Overall applicability is the summary of the former four columns. Since GB20272 is the baseline 
for analysis, its four aspects are given by detail information instead of scores. Our literature review does not aim to 
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serve as the basis for systematic analysis, so it is by no means to cover all related literatures. Only widely-used and 
highly relevant ones are included, which we believe are sufficient for the modeling work in the scope of our study.  
        Table 1. Comparison of security criteria and standards. 
Name Evaluation 
Basis 
Evaluation 
Object 
Yeah Overall 
feasibility 
GB20272 [7] Security 
Requirements 
Operating 
systems 
2006  
Common Criteria [4] ***** ***** 2009 ***** 
Orange Book [8] ***** ***** 1985 *** 
ISO27000 Series [9] * ** 2005 ** 
ISO21827 (SSE- 
CMM)[10] 
*** ** 2008 ** 
GB17859 [11] ** ***** 1999 ** 
GB20271 [12] ***** ***** 2006 *** 
Based on the comparison, CC and Orange Book are the most relevant standard to be mapped to GB20272. To 
estimate the overall development effort of a secure OS product in compliance with GB20272, it can be mapped to a 
similar set of security functional requirements with the corresponding security level in the Orange Book, and a tailored 
set of security assurance requirements in CC.  
4. Identifying Reusable Cost Estimation Components 
There are a number of existing cost estimation models and methods that address security-related issues, including 
COSECMO [5], COCOTS Security Extension [14], SECOMO [16], Function-Point Extension Analysis [15], 
SQUARE-Based Analysis [17], SAEM [18], and Lawrence Gordon’s model [19]. The first three are COCOMO-base 
algorithm model. COSECMO address the security concern by introducing a SECU cost driver based on common 
criteria. COSECMO attempts to address not only development effort, but also the external evaluation effort, however 
it has not been validated on any actual project yet. COCOTS security extension model mainly focuses on analyzing 
security-related risks in COTS-based development and there is no security cost estimation associated. SECOMO is 
also a COCOMO-like model with an addition of two cost drivers emphasizing on attack and audit to address network 
security issues. Function point extension analysis treats the security attribute as a size multiplier and provides 
corresponding effort estimates based on function point analysis. SQUARE analysis is a cost-benefit analysis 
framework for small companies. Effort estimation for secure software development is not explicitly discussed in this 
framework. Like SQUARE analysis, SAEM is also a model to predict the cost-benefit for developing the secure 
software. Lawrence Gordon’s model provides the analysis on security investment for general information systems. 
Since it is our purpose to develop a suitable effort estimation model for GB20272 based secure software 
development, we compare the above models and evaluate the similarity between their home grounds and our particular 
project circumstance. The results are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Evaluation of existing security estimation methods. 
Name Output Referred Standard 
Validation Year 
Overall 
Feasibility 
COSECMO [5] ***** ***** * 2008 **** 
COCOTS-Security 
Extension [14] *** * ** 2003 * 
Function-Point 
Extension Analysis [15] ***** *** * 2010 *** 
SECOMO [16] *** * ** 2008 * 
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SQUARE-Based 
Analysis [17] *** * **** 2004 ** 
SAEM [18] *** * **** 2002 ** 
Lawrence Gordon’s 
model [19] **** * * 2002 * 
 
It is noted that COCOMO model is the most feasible basis for security extension and customization. COSECMO 
and FPEA model the most similar security objectives and concerns as those we need, however, they are developed for 
international standards, i.e. CC. In our case, we will need to develop an extension of cost driver for security issues 
with GB20272 as the reference standard.  
Meantime, we investigate a few relevant industry reports to understand the unique characteristics during secure 
software development and figure out the cost estimating relationships. These include the FAA guidelines [20] and 
DHS process models [21] for developing and sustaining secure software, CSI Computer Crime & Security Survey 
[23], GAO report [24] and the DoD report on Software Security Assurance [22]. Table 3 summarizes the percentage 
of added effort due to security enhancement provided by GAO report and COSECMO model. These cost relatives 
suggests similar trends. Only EAL2 to EAL 4 are reported in GAO report, we assume the effort for EAL2 are “1”, the 
efforts for other EAL are expressed as multiplier of EAL2. COSECMO provides a more complete range corresponding 
to all EALs from 1 to 7 with respect to difference project sizes [26], but it is for more generic information security 
rather than OS products. These are good examples and helpful in our method establishment.  
Table 3. Cost relative in GAO report. 
EAL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Effort relative n/a 1 1.2-3.0 1.7-4.0 n/a n/a n/a 
COSECMO 1 1 1.2-1.8 1.5-3.0 2.25-6.0 4.13-13.5 8.8-32.25 
 
Although for some EALs, there are no effort relative information in GAO report, still it can be referred as an 
industry benchmark to determine how much more effort is needed for higher security level. It should be pointed out 
that the effort indicated in Table 3 contains the effort spent on external EAL evaluation, which is not included in our 
case. We will only be modeling the internal development effort.  
5. Modeling the Cost of Security in GB20272 
In our previous studies, significantly different productivity patterns in Chinese software industry have been reported 
[2, 29]. One major difference is that software productivity in Chinese software industry is significantly higher than 
those suggested by the COCOMO II model. In this study, we start with a customized COCOMO II model representing 
typical productivity level in Chinese software industry (e.g. A=1.32, B=0.94) as the baseline model, add the cost of 
developing security requirements as emphasized in GB20272 to address additional development cost, and then 
evaluate the model. To address the security influence on the effort required to accomplish the secure system, a cost 
driver SECU is introduced into our model to reflect the extra effort needed to achieve a certain security level. The 
model is indicated in Equation (1).  
        (1) 
The cost driver SECU needs to be further elaborated with scale and corresponding multiplier. To balance the 
accuracy and generalizability of our model, we did the following special handling: (1) categorize the security cost 
driver into five scales from Nominal to Super High in order to correspond to five security levels in GB20272, which 
also need to be mapped to those from CC and Orange Book, to come up with a unified cost driver scale, (2) set the 
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industry data shown in Table 3 as the baseline and derive best a-prior for SECU multipliers. Table 4 shows the five 
rating levels of the proposed SECU driver, and the mapping relationship with those in CC and orange book.  
 
Table 4. Security cost driver rating and numeric values. 
SECU  Nominal High Very High Extra High Super High 
CC EAL1-2 EAL 3 EAL4 EAL5-6 EAL7 
Orange Book D-C1 C2 B1 B2 B3-A1 and above 
GB20272 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
 
A mini-delphi was conducted among the authors and an industry expert to derive the corresponding numeric value 
for each rating level. The security related multipliers in COSECO model, COCOTS security extension model and 
other quantitative methods have been taken into consideration for reference. The resultant numeric values of the SECU 
multiplier are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. SECU Multiplier. 
SECU Scale Nominal High Very High Extra High Super High 
Multiplier 1 1.25-1.5 1.75-2.0 2.0-2.75 3.0-4.0 
Each rating level corresponds to a range of numeric effort multipliers. There are a couple of advantages doing so. 
One is that, similar to what COSECMO currently offer, it is a way to accommodate projects of different sizes, which 
tend to have different influence on additional security development effort even if they are at the same required security 
level. The other advantage is that, it will provide a range estimate to address certain risks associated with single point 
estimates. The final multiplier values are generally smaller than the GAO one. This is because the effort estimated in 
our model does not include the effort spent on external security evaluation, which is a part of the total effort in GAO 
report. 
6. Application  
The application of our proposed model is done through a case study project. It was the development of secure 
operating system software for computer server, enhancing a level 3 product. The project was completed in March 
2011 and the external certification was passed at security level 4 of GB20272. The evaluation is organized in three 
parts: data collection, size modeling, and evaluation result. For data confidentiality reason, we can only publish the 
final evaluation results of our proposed model. 
6.1. Data Collection 
The actual effort and size data is extracted from the organizational asset repository. 
The effort collected includes the total effort devoted to develop the secure operating system. Independent external 
evaluation effort is not considered in our model. The effort data is initially extracted from the closure report, and 
compared with that extracted from the project’s process management data repository, tracked on a weekly basis. We 
summarized the weekly effort to obtain the total effort and confirmed it with the data from the closure report. The 
effort data derived from the tool is consistent with the data from report. So the actual size and effort data is obtained. 
Due to the confidential issue, the actual size and effort data cannot be published. 
For effort estimation using the proposed model, the 22 COCOMO II cost drivers and the additional SECU cost 
driver are needed. With the help of the manager and the key developer, the driver scales are derived. The SECU driver 
is rated as very high (VH) to reflect the GB20272 Level 4 requirement.  
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6.2. Sizing 
The actual size is the total LOC in the final product. Further interviews were conducted with the project manager 
and key developers, in order to derive equivalent size of the project. The following proxy factors were derived based 
on the interview feedbacks: 
x The total product size contains 66% adopted code, 2% modified code, and 32% new-added code. The 
adopted size means the intact part of the security level 3 operating system while the modified part means 
the size that is modified from level 3 system to achieve level 4.  
x To convert the adopted part to its equivalent size, a 5% effort is needed for understanding of the adopted 
code.  
x A 40% effort is needed to understand and modify for converting the modified size into its equivalent one.  
We then propose Equation (2) to calculate the equivalent size as: 
TotalSize
TotalSizeTotalSizeTotalSize
NewSizeModSizeeAdoptedSiz
NewSizeModSizeeAdoptedSizTotalSize equequequequ
%1.36
%32%2*%40*%66*%5
*%40*%5
 
 
 
 
) 
6.3. Evaluation Results 
To evaluate the performance of the model, we choose four existing methods as comparison baselines, including 
the original COCOMO II, a local COCOMO II representing general productivity in Chinese software industry, the 
COSECMO, and a local COSECMO which is COSECMO with locally calibrated COCOMO II parameters (i.e. model 
constants A and B). It should be pointed out that COSECMO uses Common Criteria in security cost driver scale. 
Since we have integrated those standards into a unified framework, the corresponding scale can be easily mapped.  
Based on the size and cost driver input, we apply the chosen models to effort estimation for the security level 4 OS 
software. Since COSECMO estimates both internal development effort and external evaluation effort, when applying 
COSECMO, we only calculate the internal development effort with independent evaluation effort excluded. This 
consideration is consistent with the specific data situation in our setting. The metric Relative Error is used to measure 
the accuracy of the models. The validation results are shown in Table 6. 
                             Table 6. Evaluation results. 
Models Relative Error (RE) 
COCOMO II -0.73 
Local COCOMO II 0.70 
COSECMO -7.93 
Local COSECMO -0.53 
Customized Model 0.41 
 
According to the evaluation results, our estimation model has produced the best result compared with the other 
four models. This indeed proves the positive effect of model local customization based on specific industry setting. 
Generally speaking, the model performance has been remarkably improved after calibration with local data.  
Especially the accuracy of calibrated COSECMO model is remarkably increased comparing with the ones before 
calibration.  
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7. Discussion  
Performance Improvement: There are a few observations about improved estimation performance from results 
in Table 1.  
The first one is that the proposed model provides the best estimation accuracy. It is interesting to note that the 
general COCOMO II model overestimates the effort by 73%, while the local COCOMO II model underestimate the 
effort by 70%. These two results confirm that the absence of security considerations in the general COCOMO II model, 
as well as our previous conclusion on high software productivity in Chinese software industry. However, the 41% of 
relative error from our customized model indicates that it also underestimates the associated effort. A possible reason 
is that we reuse the productivity parameters calibrated from general non-security-sensitive software projects. If more 
data points become available from similar security domains, the model performance can be expected to increase 
through further calibration.  
The second observation is that among these models compared, COSECMO provides an estimate with the largest 
relative error, which is about 8 times overestimated (i.e. a RE of -7.93). COSECMO is developed largely based on 
international standard CC, and its calibration is based on 1 data points, which is from security-critical software-
intensive systems in the US. It is not surprising considering the compound effects of dramatic differences in terms of 
software productivities and security standards in the two countries. More specifically, there are several factors causing 
such differences: (1) The secure OS product in our case is actually a secure OS kernel, and might be in a much smaller 
size compared with the project that COSECMO was calibrated on. This can be confirmed by the 50% over-estimation 
of the Local COSECMO estimate. (2) Software industry in China typically has higher productivity as reported in our 
previous study [2, 29]. (3) Most secure OS products are part of government acquisition contract, and government 
acquisition systems in the two countries are totally different which greatly affect the development processes and 
categories of costing items.   
The third one is that local calibration helps to improve the estimation accuracy. Both Local COCOMO II and Local 
COSECMO models outperform the generic ones. This is mainly because the local historical projects have the similar 
development profile with the targeted one including productivity, project characteristics, development platform etc. 
These similarities can provide more accurate effort estimating relationships than the general model. The assumption 
is proved by the increased accuracy after the model is locally calibrated, for both COCOMO II and COSECMO model. 
This result proves the necessity for a specific model dealing with secure software effort estimation instead of a general 
one.  
Despite of the improved performance, our model is by no means perfect. The impacts brought by security 
requirements on the other cost drivers have not been explicitly analyzed in our model. For example, a system with a 
Very High SECU level is required to achieve at least a Very High RELY scale according to COSECMO. However in 
our case, the RELY scale is merely Low. To analyze this impact, we set the RELY scale as VH and keep the other 
driver the same, the accuracy is improved to a 0.21 RE after the RELY is changed to VH. Thus, in the future, we 
intend to analyze the SECU driver’s impact on the other drivers’ scale setting. Explicit guidelines for driver scale 
setting in our model will be provide to the estimator to further improve the model performance. 
 
Secure Software Sizing: In our case, the targeted project is a security level 4 operating system upgraded on a 
security level 3 system. From the size analysis, it indicates that when the software security is enhanced, there will be 
corresponding increase of software size. We assume that unlike IT systems with complicated human-computer 
interfaces, the secure operating system focuses more on the security kernel. For a secure OS, the primary security 
objectives include identification & authentication, confidentiality, security management, accountability [25]. An 
example list of the most critical tasks consists of handling user accounts and the privileges, such as file access and OS 
configurations (identification & authentication), generating error message and providing the administrator system log 
to track the error (Accountability), and providing security schemes of automatic detection of security attack, etc. The 
increased security of operating system requires more sophisticated security functionality instead of more complicated 
interface control. The enhanced functionality is always reflected on the increase of system size. 
 In our model, the size input is decomposed into different categories in GB20272. Although the effort spent on 
security assurance categories is not reflected in the corresponding size, it gets reflected in the cost driver to derive 
total effort. We believe that the assurance effort including testing, enhanced requirement and design, other 
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management tasks and so on can be measured by the size of test cases and other documentation. The separation for 
sizes of different parts means the potential separation of effort on security function and assurance. This may provide 
the possible future refinement for our estimation model. 
Furthermore, we break down the total size into several parts according to components in GB20272. The security 
assurance effort is not reflected on the product size, our analysis result shows that about 72% of the total size are 
related to the six categories of security functional requirements in GB20272. However, the effort referred in our report 
indicates the total effort including the part contributing to the security assurance.  
 
Threats to Validity: Nonetheless, there are some limitations in our work. First, the literature review is not a 
systematic one. Although our method is chosen based on the behavior analysis, there is still a chance that some better 
methods may exist out of our literature review scope. Second, the multiplier for SECU cost driver is based on the 
industry report and expert judgment. This may affect the accuracy of the estimation result. Third, the calibration of 
parameters A and B are based on seven historical projects. However, these projects have no particular concern on 
system security. Thus, the local calibrated parameters A and B in the model may not exactly reflect the secure system 
characteristics. Last, only data from one project is used to evaluate our model. This may make the conclusion biased 
by the single data point. Also according to the detail analysis, some effort reported in higher system level has 
contributed to the secure system development without being counted into this project. This may jeopardize the final 
result. 
8. Conclusions 
Effort estimation for secure software is really difficult but vitally important for software companies and 
organizations. In this paper we report an approach in developing a customized model for developing a specific line of 
secure software products, secure operating system, in China. The research effort is driven by the actual problems and 
challenges that chinese software companies are facing when planning for security sensitive software projects due to 
limited applicability of available methods and mismatch in existing underlying standards. We investigate the existing 
cost estimation relationships in the domain of secure software systems, then conduct a comparative analysis of existing 
Chinese IT security standards and the corresponding international standards, and build a customized estimation model 
to leverage cost estimation relationships with the most similar security requirements, with appropriate adjustment to 
reflect the differences in standards. The resultant model is evaluated through an example project and results show 
encouraging improvement in estimation accuracy. 
Future work include: (1) to expand our literature review scope so that some other methods may be found to be 
taken into consideration; (2) to collect more data on secure software projects, and further calibrate and validate our 
model; (3) to develop practical guidelines for continuously and consistently collecting metric data on sizing, and driver 
multiplier to support estimation and comparison across companies and standards.  
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